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ABSTRACT
The organizational development, legislative background and some
historical highlights of the present day Naval Selected Air Reserve are
presented. The various facets of the existing organization including
the support groups and the flying and non flying components are outlined
with respect to mission, capabilities, requirements cost and effective-
ness. The present and forseeable militjary-economic situation is
examined with respect to the capabilities and requirements of the Naval
Selected Air Reserve and then the feasible alternatives to perform the
missions presently envisioned for the Naval Selected Air Reserve are
examined. Finally, recommendations as to the most desireable of
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The A|aval Air Reserve had its inception on 29 August 1916 with the
passage of the iMaval Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1917. The present
Naval Air Reserve Program, more recently designated the Naval Selected
Air Reserve, was inaugurated in July of 1946. The existing laws under
which the present ""Weekend Warrior" operates are even more recent. By
way of introduction these points have been mentioned to indicate that
while the aviation reserve programs are nearly as old as the regular
aviation programs, they have undergone considerable change throughout
the years. Recently this change has accelerated as have so many other
facets of iuodern naval warfare. We hope to determine whether or not
today's Selected Air Reserve is compatible with the regular forces in the
light of these changes. Does the Selected Air Reserve have a feasible
mission and is it being accomplished in an economic mannerV Is the
military worth of the reserve forces being measured by a realistic standard
in the light of the present and expected future strategic situation? And
finally if the existing structure is not optimal within the present economic-
military worth framework what are some of the feasible alternatives.
The purpose of the following paragraphs will be to answer the above
questions within the limitations imposed by available unclassified data

on the present reserve components and the admitted uncertainty of the
future military-political situation. It is hoped that the study will be of
sufficient clarity and definition such tha>t it could assist interested
policy making personnel and planners in an accurate reappraisal of the
Naval Air Reserve Program. At the very least it should generate an
awareness in cognizant personnel that some utilization of modern principles
of economics is required for an accurate determination of military worth.
Two important reasons lie behind the necessity for this approach.
First is the fact of the complicated interrelationships that exist in the
military world. The military world does not stand alone as we finally
realized as a nation so forcefully in Korea. The weapon has given way to
the weapon system and the weapon system exists only within a balanced
force structure which is in turn dependent on intracacies of national and
international policy which are in turn affected by the new weapons and
strategics o
Secondly and partially because of the interrelationships mentioned
the need for efficient expenditure of each military dollar has become
critical. The competition for a reduced number of dollars (with respect
to increased requirements) has increased in the past few years and because
of the complexity and interrelationships of the total systems involved it is
more important that the correct decisions are made at xan early pq^nt in time.
Modern management techniques in general use such as PERT etc. have
given us improved ability to budget our funds effeciently within a particular

program. It is important that planners and policy makers extend the use
of these techniques into the general area of planning for military effective-
ness. Any decision in this area is an economic as well as military-polit-
ical one and if approached from this viewpoint the resulting decisions
cannot help but be more efficient in the long run.
It is probable that the findings and conclusions that may be drawn
will be valid only within the particular economic-military area within
which they are constructed, Various external factors are always at work
and especially in these areas so that the more efficient solution from an
economic-military aspect may well be tempered by apparently extraneous
factors before final adoption. One of these factors which may be used as
an example concerns the historical use of reserve military forces in
general in this country,. The military history of the United States has
been characterized in the main by the absence of the professional corps
comparable to those utilized by nations such as Great Britain, France,
Germany., Japan and many others. Neither have we relied on the use of hired
mercenaries except in a few isolated instances during the late Indian Wars.
The average American when considering the subject of the military mercenary
brings to mind not the "gallant" French Foreign Legion but the hated Hessions
against which "Washington was pitted. Whatever the basic cause of these
particular points of view may be
(
the net result of this state of affairs has
been the employment of volunteers and reserves in lieu of professionals
and mercenaries in the United States Armed Forces. Reserve forces played
a decisive role in each of the eight major conflicts to which the United

4States has been a pari: in the last 180 years. Because of this ingrained
reliance on reserve forces in the past there is always the possibility that
the present missions of the reserve forces are based less on a strict basis
of efficiency than on their assumed inherent value within the general in-
stitutional structure. This study will not attempt to incorporate these
factors within the actual analysis. They are pointed out though as one of
the additional factors that may affect the results of a study based on the
less emotionally involved military-economic factors.
In all probability somewhat similar studies have been made within
the Department of Defense with reference to the Reserve Components of the
Army and the National Guard. Mr. McNamara's statements of last fall
concerning the proposed merger of those units and references to "decisions
preceded by careful study" leaves little doubt that some sort of economic-
military analysis was under taken in this case. However, because of their
already outwardly stringent structures it does not seem probable that the
Naval Reserve Components were subjected to the same searching analysis.
Considerable correspondence with various policy level officials in the
Reserve Officers at Headquarters CNARESTRA in Glenview and in Washington
failed to turn up any such previous study Therefore it is assumed that this
is the only such paper utilizing this particular approach devoted to this
particular topic to date. By utilizing an objective approach as possible
and remaining within the economic framework with respect to criteria and
conclusions it is hoped that relevant recommendations will result.

5The study will commence with the purely historical background
preceding the present Organized Naval Air Reserve and will be roughly
divided into two separate areas, the first up to and including World War II
and the second from the cessation of hostilities until the present. Each
of these sections will discuss the pertinant Laws and Acts under which
the Air Reserve operated daring varying portions of each period. The
physical aspects such as personnel, equipment, facilities and appropria-
tions will be discussed along with the political and strategic forces at
work during the various re-organizations. By this method a better under-
standing of the present organization can be achieved. It should then be
possible to compile a complete picture of the present Air Reserve Organiza-
tion with respect to make-up, mission, and cost. From this point we will
discuss the present economic-military situation in general and then how
it pertains to the present Reserve organization. The next point in the
analysis will be to determine the actual capabilities of the Selected Air
Reserve^! what portions appear to be required in the light of the previous
discussion and finally what are the feasible alternatives in terms of
effectiveness and cost. In conclusion an^ttempt will be made to
recommend optimum future courses of action based on all the foregoing.

CHAPTER II
PRIOR TO WORL.D WAR II
The authority for the first nucleus of a Naval Air Reserve, actually
identified as an "Aeronautic Reserve" to the Naval Militia in the various
states was proposed and adopted by the Navy Department in 1915. At this
point it was entirely a volunteer organization operating on donated funds,
By 1916 a total of ten state run militia units had commenced operations,
primarily to satisfy the desire for adventure and flight time among naval
oriented aviation enthusiasts. Official federal status was first achieved
on 29 August 1916 with the passage of the annual naval appropriations
act which contained in that year a rider providing for the establishment of
a Naval Reserve Flying Corps.
Naval Aviation itself had only commenced five short years before and
was still considered an unlikely stepchild. In 1916 total aviation
appropriations were limited to one million dollars. Personnel were limited
to 48 officers and 96 enlisted men plus 12 Marine officers and 24 enlisted
men. At the time we entered World War I, the total naval and marine
aviation manpower had climbed to 48 officers and 239 enlisted men.
Meanwhile, the establishment of the Naval Reserve Flying Corps in 1916
had prompted students at several colleges to start flying units; The first
of these groups was the Yale Unit which flew anf early Curtis flying boat
at Peacock Point, Long Island during the summer of 1916. By March of
1918 this unit was training with regular forces and in August two members

7of the unit were ordered to France. A number of other units and bases
were established shortly after the Yale Unit and the program expanded
very rapidly after that. So much so that by the end of the war in November
1918 Naval aviation consisted of over twenty five hundred officers with
thirty nine hundred in training and over thirty thousand enlisted men,,
practically all reserves. Few of the regulars served in France since they
were needed to operate the training stations and air fields and to man the
battleships in the Fleet.
Considering their modest beginning the record of the aviation branch
during World War I was noteworthy in that they had established twenty
oversea b&ses, attacked or sunk twelve submarines and flown almost
two and one half million miles of coastal patrol.
The period after the war saw the ndrmal decline in military forces but
for naval reserve aviation forces the decline was especially abrupt. So
much so that by 1923 when the four year terms of the last Naval Reserve
Flying Corps members expired and no money was alloted by Congress for
training the reserve aviation force was in effect non-existent.
Fortunately by this time there were among the aviation minded per-
sonnel within the Navy Department a few forward looking individuals who
wanted to retain some of the reserve bases for training new pilots and to
keep some of the wartime aviators proficient if possible. At the same
time there was the overall desire to broaden the aviation base and so in
1923 despite the almost total lack of funds the first part of a two prong

8program was installed. The first portion of the program was the re-activa-
tion.of the Naval Reserve Bases. The first to be activated was manned by
a volunteer group of New York. City Police., The group was based at Fort
Hamilton and when the Navy gave them four N-9 aircraft on 22 December
1923 the Naval Aviation Reserve was back in business. The second portion
concerned the training of aviators,, During the summer of 1923 a total of
thirty-three students, normally individuals with previous flying experience
were enlisted as Seamen Second Class, given a total of ninety days
training and commissioned as Ensigns in the Naval Reserve if they passed
a professional examination. These men were returned to their volunteer
units to train new recruits. This portion of the program operated at about
this level until the first training funds for extended duty were made
available by Congress in 1928. These funds had become legally available
through passage of the first Naval Reserve Appropriations Act of 1925.
This act created the United States Naval Reserve providing for the Fleet
Reserve, the Merchant Marine Reserve, and the Volunteer Reserve. Hitherto
all reserves had been either State Naval Militias, National Naval Volunteers
or the Naval Reserve of men with previous Navy service. The Act also
authorized pay for drills and annual training duty.
The Naval Air Reserve Training Program as such was commissioned in
1924 one year prior to the Naval Reserve Appropriations Act of 1925, when
a Naval Reserve Division was established within the Bureau of Navigation.
#
The original mission of the program was to "produce qualified Naval
Reserve personnel for active duty during time of war. " Although a number

of new bases were opened across the country during this period of the
late twenties and early thirties the program objectives in general
floundered because of lack of funds and good training facilities. Attrition
in the regular forces and failure of many of the reserve trainees to meet
professional requirements held the manpower base far below the desired
levels.
Excellent experience was being obtained in the operating and
organizing of the components of the Air Reserve establishment however.
Bases were operated by enlisted reserves from the local area who stayed at
the one location. These men were commonly known as Station Keepers, a
title they hold to this day. The Station Keepers were directed by Reserve
officers on short, six to eighteen month tours of duty with a single regular
officer as commanding officer. This operating concept developed and
perfected during the lean years is basically the same modus operandi under
which the present day reserve stations continue to operate. By this time
the offical mission of the reserve had expanded slightly to "procure,
organize, and train the officers and men necessary in the event of war. "*
The first marked improvement in the training program as a whole was
designed to bring larger numbers of well trained aviators into the fold.
The background of the 1935 Act was very frankly the failure of the earlier
programs. The first one year training group of fifty Ensigns graduating
from the reserve facilities in 1928 had been a disappointment, because of
poor training therefore subsequent groups were sent to Pensacola. In
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addition the one year limitation and small number involved had not fulfilled
Navy Department objectives. With the gradual build up of the Navy to
treaty strength (1910 airplanes) there were just not enough bodies to go
around. The Bureau of the Budget wanted more enlisted men. The Navy
Department wanted more officers so that the Cadet Law became a compromise.
The solution was that incumbents spent their entire enlistment period which
consisted of four years on active duty as a cadet. At the end of this period
they reverted to inactive duty as an Ensign in the Naval Reserve. Only
one major change to this program was made prior to World War II. That was
the Naval Aviation Reserve Act of 1939 by which cadets were commissioned
as designs upon graduation from Pensacola and then became eligible for
promotion to Lieutenant (junior grade) after three years active duty with the
fleet.
After approximately three years of discussion a new Naval Reserve
Act was passed in 1938 superseding the Reserve Act of 1925. Although /
/
there were few provisions exclusively applicable to the aviation components
./
there was much of interest to the reserve program as a whole included in
this law. The laws 1 primary effect was to lay down new and revised per-
sonnel concepts under which the Naval Reserve would operate through World
War II and the Korean Conflict with respect to seniority, promotibn and
retirement. The first of these was the provision for a normal retirement
pay after 20 years active duty or a modified retirement alter various
combinations of active and inactive duty. This new concept provided a





lacking. In a somewhat liberalized form under existing laws it still
provides in many cases the major retention aid in the continuous struggle
to maintain personnel complements at allowed levels.
Other important provisions of the bill included the establishment of
a reserve policy board, flag rank for the reserves and liberalized promo-
tion which involved setting up the "running mate" system whereby each
reserve's precedence was established with respect to a regular Navy
counterpart so that both became eligible for promotion at the same time.
These last two clauses did not pass without considerable opposition from
the old guard in the Bureau of Aeronautics who felt that "officers of these
(flag) ranks would increase the difficulties of regular Navy officers in
dealing with the Naval Reserve. "2 In addition they felt that the section
dealing with the relative precedence of reserve officers when mobilized
with regular Navy for war or national emergency would interfer with the
internal organization of squadrons to which reserve officers were attached. 3
The final wording of the law then was a compromise between those who
would have placed all reserves behind those of the regular forces with the
same grade and those who would have placed all on an equal status based
on date of commissioning.
Of the items directly concerned with aviation in the bill the most
important were that the Fleet Reserve was to be composed only of personnel
transferred from the regular Navy to the Naval Reserve. Complementary to
this was the provision that the actively drilling components of the existing
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Fleet Reserve which included at the present time the flying squadrons in
the aviation units were to be transferred to a new category; The Organized
Reserve. This was the inception of the present day Organized Reserve.
Unfortunately the new laws while admittedly improving and clarifying
the reserve status did little to alleviate the shortage of trained aviation
personnel for the reserve squadrons. The major impediment was a continuing
lack of sufficient funds. Several ambitious plans were put forth by both
the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Navigation,, but whenever the
Bureau of the Budget cut funds reserve training was the first item deleted
4
from the proposed budget. As early as 1935 minimum mobilization require-
ments by the time of completion of the Treaty Navy for reserve officers in
the various aviation categories was set at 7, 453. ^ At this time there were
only 631 reserve officers enrolled in these categories. In 1939 the
Bureau of Navigation estimated that with the existing programs there
would be 1, 548 naval aviators in the reserve by 1 July 1948, despite
the fact that the goal was 6, 000.
As late as 1940 Bureau of Navigation plans for an increase in aviation
cadets at Pensicola were disallowed by the Bureau of the Budget. The
aviation Cadet Program was fulfilling one of its original purposes in
creating a broader base of trained pilots but practically all graduates were
being absorbed into the regular forces so that the reserve squadrons were
not able to expand appreciably.
Although the appropriations granted by Congress were the obvious
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limiting factor for reserve activities throughout this period there appreared
to a general unwillingness at the Secretary of Navy and Department levels
to upgrade the priority of reserve training and mobilization requirements.
A Navy Department Board convened to study the problem made this
comment:
"The chairman of the House Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations
stated that there had been an insistent, widespread urge, bordering
on propaganda, to expand the Reserve Appropriation, and that however
desirable that maybe, the subcommittee has been advised by the
Chief of Naval Operations that there are uses for any money, additional
to the Budget that the Congress might be willing to provide, of a
much higher priority. " *
This condition persisted until war became imminent in 1941. Fortunately
however, the ground work for the rapid expansion that was soon to take
place had been laid. The organization was sound, morale high and
training excellent. But of the thousands of Reserve Pilots that would be
required during World War II only 600 were available immediately. It was
this trained nucleus that filled the gap in 1941-1942 until the war time
training programs hit their stride and in a good part it was the reserve
machinery that helped the program to get on its feet during this difficult
period.
In summary this initial phase of the aviation reserve program aside
from the successful work in World War I was characterized by a continuing
but unsuccessful battle to fulfill its basic mission-of providing a ready
reserve of trained personnel in case of war. The organizational and legal
ground work upon which the future reserve forces would be built was
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completed however, and some of the areas of discussion as to the proper
employment of Reserve and relative priority of the Reserve Programs had
been brought out into the open. The thinking at higher policy levels that
necessarily shaped the structure and manning level of the reserves,, during
this between war period necessarily drew on past mobilization experience.
Although establishment of a large force prior to hostilities was the pub-
lished aim apparently the unwritten policy was that sufficient time would
be available to train and mobilize after any declaration of war.
NOTES
1. United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Navv Department Appropriations Bill, Hearings before
the Committee, 1936, p. 213.
2. United States Navy, Bureau of Aeronautics, Letter from Chief BuAer
to .Chief BuNav, File Aer-A-ML, QR/P11-1, A18-1, 7 April 1938,
3. Ibid .
4. United States Navy Plans Division, Memorandum to Chief BuAer,
file Aer-PL-12-NS, A16 (O-Pers) 10 December 1935.
5. United States Congress, op_. cit,, 1937, p 188.

CHAPTER III
WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT
As previously noted the number of reserves expanded tremendously
during the war. The first period of the reserve program which had been
devoted primarily to the organization and development of the framework
was finished. During the war training and moving men out to the fleet
was the one goal of both the reserve and regular components. By the end
of the war eighty seven percent of the total personnel on active duty in
the Navy were reserves. Immediately after the war, over three million
l
were demobilized.
In aviation the output grew at a tremendous rate. From 1935 to
1940 only 1, 800 reserve cadets had been trained, And in June 1940 there
were only 2, 965 pilots on active duty in the Navy (with 1, 740 aircraft to
fly). By the beginning of the war the total number of aviators had risen
to almost 6, 000 but only 4, 000 were combat qualified.
The Navy was determined however, that this vast source of trained
manpower would not be completely lost as it had been after World War II.
To implement this resolve Secretary of the Navy established a board early
in 1945 charged with the responsibility for re-establishing the Naval
Reserve Training Program. One of the basic concepts originated by the
board was that of an integrated program at departmental levels rather than
the separate programs conducted during the 1930's. Immediately below this
level surface and air were split with an overall separate command established
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for aviation facilities in Chief of JMaVal Reserve Training (CNARESTRA)
stationedatGlenview 111. The Reserve chain of command is shown in
Figure 1.
The machinery for the command was operating by the end of 1945 but
the formal commissioning did not take place until July 1946. During this
period considerable discussion had ensued as to the actual personnel and
organizational formats that would be utilized. Once again the Navy Depart-
ment stated it could not provide sufficient regular personnel to man the
program without imparing other committments. Congress was equally
adamant that the program must operate under a separate budget and funds
would be used for reserve purposes only. The solution followed the concept
developed in the 1930's in that the program would be manned primarily by
reserves retained on active duty under the provisions of the 1938 Act.
Regular officers would serve in some of the departmental level billets and
as commanding officers of the training activities.
No particular ' changes were made in personnel or organizational
policies until 1951. B^ tkeki time the call up for the Korean emergency had
revealed certain inequities and apparently unfair personnel policies. Under
particular attack were those policies concerned with calling up of
unaffiliated individuals plus those concerned with reportedly highly
restrictive promotion policies. Considerable improvement in the individual
reserved status and that of the organization with regards to these aspects
were incorporated in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1951. However this
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NAVAL RESERVE CHAIN OF COMMAND
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was not done without considerable oppoistion from within the Navy
Department. * The Navy's views on reserve promotion were still consider-
ably more restrictive than those of the other services. Part of this, could
probably be traced to the fact that there was less emphasis on group
training (such as in the National Guard) and more on individual training
with the resulting fear of the reserve officer coming aboard a ship or into
a squadron on active duty and outranking his regular counterpart. Still
further clarification and improvement of promotion, retention, retirement,
recall and pay provisions were made in the Reserve Forces Act of 1954.
The last major ammendments to these acts were made as late as 1959.
The majority of the major organizational changes were incorporated
in the 1955 Act. By 1954, the poor condition of the nation's reserves
as a whole had been noticed and commented on by many military and
political leaders. At that time we had a total of 2. 2 million so called
ready reservists in all the services but only 695, 000 were actually
participating in training programs. A large part of the problem at this
time was the lack of clarification of the status of the individual with
respect to callup This was a situation which had persisted since the
Korean callup when many individuals who had never affiliated with any
organized group found themselves among the first to be called. To correct
this situation the following three categories within which all reserves are
contained were established:
1. The Rsady Reserves. Those liable for active duty either in time
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of .war, in time of national emergency declared by the Congress or
proclaimed by the President, or when authorized by law. Within the
Navy the selected reserve is part of the ready reserve.
2. The Standby Reserve. Those who are liable for active duty only
in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when
otherwise authorized by law. No standby reservist in an inactive status
can be ordered to active duty involuntarily unless the Secretary of that
service determines that reservists in an active status with required
qualifications are not available. "While not required to do so, a con-
siderable number of standby reservists participated in reserve training
programs.
3. The Retired Reserve. Those Reserve personnel who have been
retired, some of whom have service connected disabilities. They are
subject to recall during time of war or national emergency declared by
Congress only after the Secretaries of the individual services determine
that there are insufficient numbers of reservists available in an active
status,
Within the Navy in addition to the above reservists, enlisted men
in the Fleet Reserve are available for recall to fill mobilization billets
without further training. These are men who have retired from active
service twenty years or more in the regular Forces. They remain in the
Fleet Reserve until they have completed a total of 30 years of service.
Other major changes instituted as a result of the 1955 Act, did not
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in general pertain to the Naval Air Reserve, Included among these was
the establishment of a nationwide operational command for management
of Naval Reserve training (except Air Reserves).
To further implement the thinking of the 1955 Act and to improve
mobilization responsiveness CNO established in 1958 the "selected reserve.
"
At the present time all of the drill pay organized units and squadrons of
the air reserve are included in this category. These units are the ones
with which we are particularly concerned since the major portion of the
Reserve funds are allocated in one way or another to the maintenance and
training of this group.
Specifically the "Selected Reserve" consists of "those individuals
and units within the ready reserve of the Naval Reserve designated by
CNO as so essential to the initial wartime missions as to require priority
treatment. " Individuals and units are pje-selected and carry orders to
specific assgnments in case of mobilization.
Partly because of the personnel policies but primarily because of
variations in allotted funds the number of activities and personnel varied
considerably during this period. The peak occurred during the late 1940's
and through to the early 1950*s with 28 major activities located at various
air stations and almost 50 satellite activities • Reduction in funds closed
ten of the air stations and all of the tlaan existing satellite activities.
Today a total of 12 Naval Reserve Air Stations and six Naval Air Reserve




Reserve Divisions (tenants at surface facilities) provide all of the support
for the Selected Air Reserve Program. Table I lists the various active air
stations and training units, their active duty complement, and plant
account value. Inactive duty personnel on board during this same period
ranged from a high of about 43, 000 just prior to Korea to low of 14, 000 2
in 1962 after the Berlin Crisis. At the present time the Selected Air
Reserve consists of approximately 8, 000 officers, half pilots and half
ground staff and 19, 000 enlisted men directly supported by slightly less
than 10, 000 active duty personnel.
Of general interest it should be noted that of the nearly one million
men in the reserve forces of all the services the Navy contingent numbers
approximately 120, 000 with approximately 27, 000 of the total in the Naval
Aviation Program^ In addition to the Reserve Forces as such there are
at present about 27, 000 officers and 55, 000 enlisted reserves on active
duty with the Regular Forces.
The Reserve Forces achieved several outstanding performances during
this same period. The most noteworthy of these was their timely support
of the regular forces in Korea. Over 250, 000 naval reservists were called
to active duty between 1950 and 1953 and more than 11, 000 of these were
Naval Air Reservists. During a typical month of air operations in Korea
75 percent of the 8, 000 sorties were flown by Naval Reserve aviators.
In 1961 Congress authorized the President to recall up to 250, 000




NAVAL SELECTED AIR RESERVE FACILITIES*
I Air Stations
Active Duty Personnel Plant Account
Activity Officer Enlisted Civilian Class I & II
Atlanta 41 422 75 5,389,000
Dallas 52 659 102 11,591,000
Glenview 59 704 128 17,700,000
Gross Isle 49 504 94 9,696,000
Los Alamitos 69 851 121 12,069,000
Minneapolis 46 447 91 6,525, 000
New Orleans 49 516 103 23, 152,000
New York 59 726 151 29,850,000
Olathe 52 511 141 18,650,000
Seattle 53 492 209 35, 163,000
So. Weymouth 51 582 117 19,811,000
Willow Grove 62 640 120 14,463,000
II Naval Air Reserve Training Units
Alameda 38 514 12
Andrews 33 291 12
Jacksonville 27 327 8
Lakehurst 20 128 6
Memphis 25 234 8
Norfolk 25 182 10





IV Staff Glenview 75 105
*




Reserve , Anti-Submarine Squadrons were recalled for an eleven to twelve
month period under this authorization,, The group consisted of 676 officers
and 2, 976 men and 190 aircraft (P2V Neptunes and S2F Trackers) and were
augmented by about 170 Reserve Training Command personnel. This recall
was a departure from earlier concepts of the reserve program. In the past
the reserves were to be utilized only in the event of "a total mobilization
or emergency. "
Although the Berlin callup was apparently successful in that it amply
demonstrated to the Soviets that the United States was prepared to meet
force with force over this issue it was less than successful in other ways.
In general where reserve forces reported to duty at regular establishments
procedures and facilities were not adequate to handle the influx and
monumental losses in manpower resulted. This was particularly evident
in the Army. However, within the Navy units called the material condition
of the reserve training ships and squadrons was well below fleet standards.
Much of the ASW equipment being utilized in the reserves was obsolete,
personnel shortages existed in critical rates and squadrons were not
compatible with fleet units in size or composition. Only two of the units
were deployed overseas. Conditions Similar to this had not been noted
during the Korean period for several reasons. First of all, a large portion
of the reservists were recalled as individuals and were moved into regular
squadrons to bring them up to wartime strength. In most cases they were
working with and flying equipment the same as or quite similar to that of
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"World War II. This was true also for those units called up en masse.
Little transition in tactics or training was required and their equipment
was generally current.
Particular note should be made of the several important factors not
primarily concerned with personnel or organizational aspects that were
behind these differing performances of 1950-1953 and 1961-1962. The
first of these was the rapid technological advances that were made in
equipment and techniques and the second was the accompanying rise in
equipment costs. Superimposed upon these was an overall reduction of
funds available to reserves after continuing urgent fleet requirements
, were met. One personnel factor does enter however and should be
mentioned, that is the increasing skill levels required to maintain the
new weapons systems. All of these factors will be discussed at length
in later paragraphs as they bear on the determination of feasible and
recommended future missions for the Aviation Reserves. They have been
mentioned at this point since it was during this period that they first
began to evidence themselves.
This then concludes the background and developmental aspects of
the reserve program as a whole and the Organized Naval Air Reserve,
now the Selected Air Reserve, in particular. From the tone and text of
recent statements by top level military and civilians within the Navy,
DOD and the legislative branch it appears quite certain that the country
generally is committed to a substantial reserve force both inactive and
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and active as part of the Navy for many years to come. A major shift
in the world political and military situation would probably alter this
radically but this appears quite unlikely. Whether or not the aviation
components can or should retain their present mission and capabilities
unchanged is considerably less certain. Continuing developments in
many unrelated areas would appear to indicate otherwise.
We will next attempt to fix the Selected Air Reserve as it is at
this point in time with respect to men, equipment organization, training,
tb&Qabilities, cost and above all effectiveness . When this Is accomplished
these new developments that were mentioned will be discussed along
with their effect on the reserve forces.
NOT.ES
1. United States Senate, House of Representative, Committee and Armed
Services, Hearings on HR 486, 1951.
2. This extreme low was due primarily to the enlisted onboard count





The following paragraphs will complete the detailed description of
the Selected Naval Air Reserve. Included will be a discussion of the
various physical aspects such as personnel, training, equipment, facilities
. and costs plus a preliminary discussion of some aspects of the present
, capabilities.
The mission of the Naval Reserve has not changed appreciably in
recent years and is presently called out in Title 10, U.S.Co, Section 262:
"To provide qualified individuals and trained units to be
available for active duty in time of war or national emergency
and at such other times as national security may require, to
meet the requirements of the Navy in excess of the regular
component during and after the period need for procurement and
training of additional qualified individuals and trained units to
achieve the planned mobilization. "
Superimposed on this general statement of purpose and mission is
the assigned mission of the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training to:
1. Maintain Naval Air Reserve personnel in a state of training,
readiness and availability for immediate employment as aviation squadrons
with aircraft, and as augmentation of the active forces for mobilization
requirements.
2. Direct and coordinate the procurement of Naval Aviation Cadets
and Aviation Officer Candidates.
3. Furnish logistic support for the Marine Air Reserve Training Command.
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4. Support such flight operations of the Regular Navy and Marine
Corps as may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
The basic organization and administration of the reserves has not
changed in recent years and still holds to the principle of "integrated
management" set down in 1946. Under the nef? General Order 19 the
command lines flow from CNO through Chief of Naval Air Training to
Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training Units, to the various units and
squadrons. Support lines which originate at the Chief of Naval Material
flow through the Bureau of Naval Weapons and thence to all organizational
command levels as required.
As previously noted the personnel implementing this mission are
attached to the eighteen major and four satellite activities shown in
Table I. Besides the civilian employees, presently numbering 1, 420,
and the Standby Reserve there are two major groupings of personnel we
will consider in our analysis of the program,. These are the active duty
support personnel and the inactive Selected Air Reserve. At the present
time the active duty group support comprises approximately 9, 000
personnel officially known as TARS„ a term derived from Training and
Administration of Reserves. The 9, 000 TARS comprise about 1. 3 percent
of the 680, 000 personnel presently on active duty in the Navy. At
present there are roughly 800 USN personnel in this group.
As noted the primary mission of the TAR personnel is the training of
the Selected Air Reserve. These men are selected from applicants on
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Active Duty and Inactive personnel requesting active duty,, and form a
separate group that competes among themselves for promotion. This
separation is the source of one of the major problems facing the command.
That is, the lack of recent fleet operational experience, especially in the
VF/VA Q), VP and HS type squadrons (that is fighter and attack jets,
patrol and helicopter). Although BuPers Instructions call for rotation
to the operating forces as is practical very few such transfers take place
due to billet limitation in the TAR programs and because replacement is
.
not guaranteed. The resulting rotation within the command severely limits
the new blood interjected at all levels avove the very junior and has a
,
substantial effect on many of the Selected Reserve programs. This
condition can be especially trying to the recent fleet qualified Selected
Air Reservist who often resents and becomes discouraged with what he
may rightly consider obsolete methods and requirements.
Several aspects of the assigned secondary missions of CNARESTRA
previously mentioned deserve some discussion at this point. Perhaps
most important of these is his responsibility to direct and coordinate
_
procurement and recruiting of flight candiates and aviation specialists
.for the Regular Navy. He also acts as the primary recruiting activity for
the enlisted air reservists. To perform these activities efficiently a
group of recruiting, specialists has evolved within the reserve command
and forms the nucleus of a group which is supplemented by other tempor-
arily assigned personnel from within the command. In 1964 this group
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consisted of 136 and 253 men respectively. For the past four years over
3, 000 flight candidates in various categories that have survived the prelim-
inary mental and physical testing program have been referred annually
to the Bureau of Naval Personnel. In addition to this approximately
..12,, 000 enlisted reserves for various programs are recruited annually.
CNARESTRA's responsibilities for logistic support to the Marine Air
Reserve Training program occupy a substantial portion of the command's
activities due to the substantial size of the Marine contingent which
totals about 40 flying squadrons in addition to their support squadrons.
The entire Marine flight program utilized about 22 percent of the available
flight hours and 25 percent of the operating or Bravo Funds. This is an
extremely necessary portion of the mission since the Marine Selected Air
Reserve Squadrons do not have facilities of their own.
The final aspect of the assigned mission is that of support of ''such
flight operations of the Regular Navy and Marine Corps as may be directed
by CNO" and occupies a relatively small niche in the total picture.
Although the strategic spacing of many of the Reserve Air Stations can
be a convenience to the regular forces when dispersing for hurricanes or
when individual aviators elect to remain overnight for personal reasons
r the level of this activity with regards to personnel requirements and
facilities is not high. The primary reason for this is that parts and
servicing for regular Navy aircraft will seldom be available at a reserve





The Selected Air Reserve onboard count as of December 1964 consisted
of 21, 000 enlisted and 7, 200 officers. This was equivalent to 22. 4
percent of the authorized ceiling of 126,, 000 for all Navy drill pay reserve
personnel fixed by CNO. These personnel are succeptable to further
, breakdown on the basis of units with assigned aircraft and units without
^assigned aircraft. A complete personnel breakdown for the Selected
Reserve units is shown in Table II.
At the present time there are approximately 3, 500 officers and 15, 000
.
enlisted personnel in the flying units. These personnel are organized into
the squadrons shown in Table |J» It should be noted at this point that the
additional 40 Marine squadrons previously noted are utilizing the same
I
...aircraft, attack, fighter and helicopter as their naval counterparts but
on alternate week-ends. The Navy attack and fighter squadrons are
essentially the same size as the regular squadrons. The other squadrons
a
for reasons of training compatibility are about one-third of the equivalent
regular type.

Number Personnel on Boar
Type of Unit of Units Officer Enlistee
VF (Fighter) 16 365 1,040
VA (Light Attack) 13 453 887
VS (Carrier ASW) 39 954 2,762
HS (Helicopter ASW) sb 435 1, 111
VP (Patrol ASW) 65 1,291 6,419
VP (Tactical Support) 57 1,024 2,420
NARMU 27 221 1,041
Air Wing Staff 18 1,037 2,966
NAIRU 22 692 172
NARDIV 4 39 345
WEPTU 51 662 10
31
TABLE II















* Data current as of June 1964.
The training of these squadron personnel plus basic rate training and
_
^aircraft maintenance utilize the vast majority of the direct man hours \
, available from the active duty support personnel. Pilot training as
previously mentioned is not always up-to-date in all aroas but in general
is good. One measure of this is that the accident rate in the reserves
,
is the lowest of any Navy command. Minimum average flight hours in the
VS and VP squadrons are 172 per year. Enlisted training at the basic levels
is generally good and is supplemented by extended periods of Summer
Active Duty in various service schools and in the Fleet.
It is in the area of advanced training that the system begins to
break down and for a variety of reasons. The first is the non-availability
of sufficient TAR enlisted instructor personnel trained in advanced technical
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areas. This situation is aggravated at this time, fiscal years 1964 to
1966, due to the large numbers of World War II personnel retiring. At
the present time First Class and Chief Petty Officers are retiring faster
than they can be replaced through normal advancements. This problem of
decreasing experience level is being combated by sending as many of the
remaining personnel as possible to advanced schooling. The second
obvious difficulty is generic to the overall situation. That is the basic
problem of classroom instruction itself. It is difficult to hold the attention
of the trainee even with the best equipment/ instructors and techniques.
The relatively short weekend duty period, much of which is taken up with
administrative functions is too short to develop the "learning situation."
To implement its training program the Reserve Command is the Navy's
largest holder of training devices; over 7, 000 o Although their devices
^yield excellent results with pilots and certain air crew categories many
groups do not obtain anything near optimum benefit because of the lack
of practical work available in their specialized areas. This area of the
problem is extremely basic, it has existed since the beginning of the
program and will continue into the foreseeable future.
Simply stated the problem revolves about the fact that a limited
amount of aircraft and related equipment (and much of this obsolete) is
available to the reserves „ Coupled with it is the fact that in any flying
organization one of the major if not the criteria for efficiency is the
percent of up-aircraft that are in a flight status fet 0800 on any operating
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day. The reserve is no exception to this practice and so the natural
tendancy is for the active duty personnel to spend the week readying a
maximum number of aircraft for flight operations on the weekend. The
direct result of this practically universal system is to severely reduce
the opportunity for much of the enlisted technical training. Instead the
.
emphasis is placed on adequate training for pilots and a limited number of
aircrew personnel. If an engine or aircraft check or electronic equipment
repair can possibly be completed for weekend operations it will be done. 2
All levels of the organization would be criticised if it were not so. It
is difficult to say whether or not this is the proper approach for the
long run and if mobilization capability is being hindered or helped by such
a policy. Without question though the training of many of the enlisted
,
reservists does suffer as does interest and thereby retention as is
evidenced by the low re-enlistment rates in this area once obligated
service is completed. * This general problem will be discussed as part of
,
the overall context in later sections of this paper.
The total reserve fleet of active aircraft consists of 805 aircraft.
This number has decreased in recent years as has the regular inventory.
Jfc was 852 in 1963 and 923 in 1962 and 2 # 023 in 1951. At the present time
.this is slightly less than ten percent of the present total Navy Inventory
of 8, 380 Active Aircraft which includes 1, 470 "pipeline" aircraft. The
high ratio of Reserve to total HTA inventory occurred in 1951 with fifteen
percent of the total in the Reserve stable. Included in the reserve fleet
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are a wide variety of models ranging from the modern jet powered supersonic
F-8 Crusaders to the venerable 22 yearl old (R5D) C-54, transports plus a
miscellany of general purpose types
„
As will be discussed later note should be made that when a squadron
is called to active duty its aircraft go with it. Therefore those individuals
who are not attached to the activated squadrons can not maintain flying
and training proficiency if they are not called to active duty. During
this period the raison d'etre so to speak for the companion squadrons as
a unit has ceased to exist. The individuals in these units then must be
used to augment units with aircraft or regular Navy units. There was a
general deterioration of the recruiting and retention problem that occurred
during the 1961-1963 Berlin Crisis and was attributed in a large part to
this condition.
The primary responsibility for and the purpose behind this phase
of the Selected Reserve Program is to provide the aircraft and personnel
to field and support 40 Fleet sized air squadrons of all types; light
attack and fighter, maritime air and carrier based ASW squadrons and a
transport capability to lift reserve forces and equipment and support the
incjrfeased MATS wartime load.
Approximately half of the aircraft inventory is involved in the ASW
effort at the present time<> All of this effort is land based. "While it
is desireable to have reserve pilots qualified in carrier landings, such
practice has proved to be a detriment to overall readiness. "5 It has
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been estimated that a 30 day period would be sufficient to re-qualify in
,
this area. It is of interest to note that the transport arm. the VR squadrons,
as a group operating with an average of 50 aircraft are 10th in size among
.., free world airlines and 28th in total passengers carried. This position is
achieved as a result of their function in air-lifting many of the reserve
„ personnel to and from their week-end drills. However, this portion of
„ their mission accounts for only one-third of their flight time.
The non°£lying aviation supporting units shown in Table II number
approximately $„ 000 officers and 4, 500 enlisted men at this time. The
emphasis in this area has been the maintenance of skills primarily through
group efforts but for the ultimate purpose of providing scarce manpower
on an individual basis to augment critical areas during any mobilization
period. The assigned missions for each of the groups are as follows.
1. NARDIVs (Naval Air Reserve Divisions) train the ships company
personnel that will bring the attack and ASW carriers, seaplane tenders
and helicopter assault ships to their wartime complement in aviation rates.
2. NAIRUs (Naval Air Intelligence Reserve Units) staff the intelligence
billets of staffs, ships squadrons and the Navy Department.
3. Air Wing Staffs are charged with the task of training hundreds
of non°aviation support personnel; the hospitalmen and flight surgeons,
^storekeepers and supply officers, aerographers and meteorologists, and
others required to put aircraft in the air, safely and with operational
efficiency. During mobilization they will also provide officers and
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enlisted men to augment the Atlantic and Pacific ASW Operational Control
Centers,
4. NARMUs (Naval Air Reserve Maintenance Units) will form the
crews at the war expanded Naval Air Stations which will service the shore
based Fleet.
5. WEPTUs (Bureau of Naval Weapons Training Units) will provide
officer specialists to fill billets in the Bureau of Naval Weapons and
its field activities.
At the present time the NAIRUs and WEPTUs are actively engaged in
providing finished studies in their particular areas and have repaid their
operating costs many times over in direct savings to the Regular Forces
and the Navy as a whole.
Training in the Support groups does not present the severe problems
encountered by the flying units. There are several reasons for this.
First, these units are generally, with the exception of the NARMUs,
practically independent of flying equipment and other expensive training
devices. Second, the majority of the individuals in these units perform
their annual training duty as individuals. Sometimes at the billet to
which they have been given mobilization orders, sometimes at miscellaneous
installations of their choice that pertain to their speciality and some-
times as in the case of the Air Wing Staff with one of the reserve
squadrons on its annual deployment. From this continuing intimate contact
with the operating forces a valuable store of up-to-date information and
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experience is brought back to the reserve units. Some of the WEPTUs and
NAIRUs require each officer to report to the entire unit on the results of
their active duty tour. All of these elements combine to make many of
these supporting units quite effective in terms of both present and future
capabilities and also from the monetary standpoint as will;, be commented
on.
The physical plant of the twelve Reserve Stations has a current plant
account value of $212, 000, 000. A realistic estimate of replacement
costs is $620^000, 000. These values do not include the six Naval Air
Reserve Training Units since they are tennant activities at Regular
stations. Military Construction Funds expended on these bases totaled
$2, 159, 000 in fiscal year 1965 down from an average of $3, 000, 000 per
year for the past five years. To give some idea of the relative position
of the reserve component with respect to the regular in this area, the
estimated replacement value of the total Navy Plant Account is $22, 000,
.000, 000. 6 Total Military Construction Funds for fiscal year 1964 were
$354, 000, 000. This means that on an overall basis for every $100 of
Class I & II Plant Account Value in the Navy today $1. 60 is being spent
yearly for new construction and upgrading of facilities. In the reserve
area the same figure comes to $, 35 per $100, As can be seen the reserve
modernization program is proceeding quite slowly at present. If the
^reserve facilities were up-to-date this would not be a significant
aspect but unfortunately the reserve bases are typified by five-year &iuo
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structures, that are twenty years old. Specific comment was made on this
point by the Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training to the Navy Inspector
General in 196£. 7
"Military construction funds have not been available to permit
an orderly replacement program of these aging facilities. Repair
and improvement funds have not been adequate to carry on major
maintenance and structural repairs to sustain these ading facili-
ties in accordance with minimum Naval standards. Operating
funds for minor repairs have also been grossly inadequate be-
cause of increases in certain fixed costs which these funds must
also cover, such as* civilian pay, utilities, and miscellaneous
essential operating expenses. The net effect of these deficiencies
is to make it difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill the mission of
the Command. "
Besides the basic problem of inadequate facilities such as barracks,
dispensaries and utilities, a secondary problem arises in the training
areas where the situation is aggravated by the lack of trained personnel
and equipment in many technical areas as has been previously mentioned.
The solution of sending as many men as possible to regular service schools
and on extended active duty, has not been entirely satisfactory. These
people are entirely lost to the reserve program during this period. Other
problems arise with school quotas and schedules at regular schools and
the compatibility of regular with reserve equipment. From the standpoint
of the reserve command the ideal solution would be adequate facilities and
equipment available within the command. This has been difficult to
justify or obtain approval for in the face of the increasing requirements of




The total fiscal year 1965 appropriation for Reserve and Guard forces
in the Navy, Program V of the Five-Year Force Structure was $396, 000, 000.
Of this amount $95, 200, 000 was set aside for the Marine Reserve Program
leaving $300, 800, 00 for the Naval Reserve. The aviation programs expended
approximately 46 percent of this; $139, 034, 000, broken down by appropria-
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Approximately 80 percent $112, 000, 000 of the money spent in the
Navy aviation program was spent directly or indirectly on the Naval
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Selected Air Reserve Squadrons. Almost 85 percent of this subtotal is
spent by or for the flying squadrons. Based on the personnel data of
Table II and the cost breakdown of Table IV it can be further shown that
the total cost per man in the flying squadrons is two and one half times that
of the support squadrons which is not unexpected because of the high
equipment cost,
For the purpose of more accurate analysis this total sum is broken
down to Total Flyinf and Support Squadron Costs in Table IV.
TABLE IV
TOTAL FLYING AND SUPPORT SQUADRON COSTS*
I Flying Squadrons:
A. Direct Personnel Costs $15, 800, 000
B. Aircraft & Allied Equipment Costs 28, 700, 000
C ^Procurement, A/C and other 17, 000, 000
D. Support Costs
1. Personnel, Station and CNARESTRA 22,300,000
2. Station Upkeep and miscellaneous 11. 200, 000
$95,000,000
II Support Squadrons
A. Direct Personnel Costs 6, 000, 000
B. Aircraft & Allied Equipment Costs 900, 000
C. Procurement, A/C and other 700,000
D. Support Costs Station and CNARESTRA
1. Personnel 7, 400, 000
2. Station Upkeep and miscellaneous 1. 000. 000
$17,000,000
* These figures have been corrected for the concurrent use by the




1. This excludes the recruiting, administrative, security, public
works and such functions not directly utilized by the inactive personnel
training and operating functions.
2. In many cases TAR personnel will work overtime on operations of
this sort and then be given extra time off on the weekends when they
should be available for instruction duties.
3. At present overall attrition is 40 to 45 percent.
4. Unfortunately the other reason for poor retention was the fact
that many reservists simply did not want to fulfill their active duty
oblication. However, this cannot truly be said to be a problem of the
reserve as such. It is more concerned with the national moral character
and as such will not be commented on further in this paper.
5. Julian Becton, "The Naval Reserve Taday, " Naval Review 1964„
February 1965.
6. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Facilities Projects
Manual. OPNAV INST P11010. 20, 8 October 1962.
7. Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training, Letter to Navy Inspector




As previously noted the original purpose of the reserve forces was
to augment the regulars in time of war. And as also stated that purpose
is basically the same today. However, the type of war with which we
are faced today and in the foreseeable future has changed radically since
the Naval Air Reserve as it is presently constituted was commissioned.
The primary question that this situation poses is this: is the change
sufficient in itself or in combination with other factors to seriously
affect either the requirements for certain Reserve Forces capabilities
or the possibility of successful performance of these same capabilities.
To answer this question we must first determine just how much war has
changed with respect to requirements and costs. Then we will determine
the types of situations with which we will be most probably faced. And
finally we will attempt a more detailed view of the cost implications in
the most probable type of e&gagement for the particular type of forces
with which we are concerned.
A number of authors * writing in the economic and general humanities
fields in addition to the military sponsors of United States long range
war plans have recognized the changing nature of modern war. The fact
of Nuclear weapons, the means of delivery, the impossibility of defense
and finally the inability to assure against retaliation form the new
weapons base in this changed concept of war. Superimposed on the
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weapons aspect are the high costs of these and the various complementary
systems necessary to produce a balanced total force. Aside from the
technical aspects this problem of a balanced force structure has been
the primary problem facing the present Secretary of Defense during his
time in office* However, we will not concern ourselves particularly
with the total force structure or cost of the entire establishment in the
United States which currently stands at approximately 50 billion per
year. Neither will the research and development aspects be discussed.
This latter aspect could also be viewed from the standpoint of its
insatiable use .of highly skilled manpower and brains that could be so
very profitably employed in other areas. This topic alone could be the
subject of several other papers and will not be considered further at
this time. Other equally interesting diversions could be created by
discussing the cost of the modern foot soldiers' equipment or the
tragically high ratio of man support necessary to keep him in the field.
At the risk of sub-optimizing we will continue to look at only the
cost of the Naval aviation and allied systems and those systems that
may be substituted for it since this is the primary purpose of this paper.
These other cost considerations while relevant are not primary to the
type and magnitude of situations that concern the overall mission of this
group of forces.
The rising costs of these forces is best reflected in actual aircraft
procurement costs as shown in Table V. However, it should be remem-
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bered that individual aircraft are many times larger and more efficient^
than in days past which is one of the primary reasons for the gradual
reduction in total aircraft numbers that have been occurring in recent
years
.
Accident costs at the present time, -,are averaging slightly over
$500, 000 per incident and between five and seven million dollars per
week for all commands. The reserves are somewhat lower than this
due to their use of older aircraft and a lower accident rate than the
regular commands. This average will esculate at a rapid rate however,
as wartime operations are enjoined even in a "limited" situation such
as Viet Nam where a recent incident at a United States controlled air










'65 (est) 1,840,000 125.00
By using less than 200 missiles the two major powers have at the
present time the capability of reducing their opponent to the status of
a third rate power or less in approximately 30 minutes from the time the
button is pushed. In return they must expect the same treatment as
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similar forces are released towards them. Each side has such a widely
spaced, effectively invulnerable means of delivery that successful
retaliation must be accepted as a fact. Next in importance to the
strategic nuclear weapons are the tactical sized nuclear weapons. The
immense power of these weapons would force opponents in a full scale
war situation to eliminate the massed firepower concepts of attack so
polular in World War II. At the present time, only two powers, United
States and the USSR are capable of weapon delivery in this area while
three others have moved into the area of nuclear capabilities, if not
delivery. Before too many years certainly the level and range of nations
with these capabilities will be increased many times. This is a universal
fact of technological progress as the late starters are spared the expen-
sive and time consuming mistakes of the leaders.
Other weapons developments, less overt perhaps but extremely real
at this time are those concerned with poison gasses, man made plagues
and crop destroying agents. What is particularly disturbing about this
range of weapons is that many of then can be released on a completely
covert basis. Results range from nusiance value to probable 100 percent
kill and can be spread over a wide time spectrum. Effects can be slow
in effect so as to be noticeable only in succeeding generations or may be
so rapid as to produce death or complete paralysis in less than 10 minutes,
These developments in weapons and costs have profoundly influenced
the types of wars that will in all probability be fought in the foreseeable
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future. The general consensus appears to be that there are three possible
types that could occur at the present time.
The most serious of these would be the all out nuclear conflict.
Fortunately, as all nations become more aware of the disasterous
consequences that would accrue to all participants in such a conflict
the probability of occurrence is becoming smaller each year. This
appears to be especially true in recent years as the size and capability
of allied conventional forces have increased and subsequently reduced
reliance on the "all or nothing" nuclear strategy. This is not to |ay
that a deterrent must not be maintained or new developments explored
to avoid being completely "one upped" by the opposition through
technological breakthrough or accidental release. Over one-third of
all United States defense dollars are presently being spent for this
purpose. Examination of the force structure of all major powers indi-
cates the same reasoning is being applied to both the probability of use
and the maintenance of a deterrence in the area of the "chemical and
bioligical" weapons.
Considerable thought has been bpen given to the possibility of
gradual esculation to this all out type of war from a limited engagement. 5
Recent history seems to run counter to this possibility though as the
principal protagonists have shown themselves increasingly unwilling to
meet each other directly. They have accepted extremely frustrating
decisions and incidents that would have provoked major conflicts in
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years past. To further forestall this possibility the United States has
increased its conventional capabilities many times over, as previously
noted, to provide "an increased number of options" in the words of Mr.
McNamara.
A second type of war situation commonly mentioned is that involving
a proplonged mobilization period Within this type we would have time
to expand our training, increase material stock piles and perform all
the other economic-military actions previously engaged in by nations
during the normal build up for war in the past. What the majority of
these writers fail to recognize however is that the United States has
been in this position since 1950. Although not always actively
exchanging gunfire on several fronts as in recent months our mobilization,
training and expenditure levels have been in excess both dollar wise
and percentage wise of many previous "war time" periods. The majority
of this type of expenditure however, is ammendable to fairly accurate
planning over an extended time period. The present Five-Year Force
Structure and Financial Plan being the primary example.
The third type of war actually covers a wide variety of situations
and in effect is best defined by its limited geographic nature. This is
the "limited" war or "brushfire" engagement so familiar in recent years.
Because of the factors previously noted this will in all probability be
the most common type of conflict for some time to come. Unfortunately
this type of conflict which can assume a wide range of sizes and forms
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does not lend i,tseli readily to planning and in fact has a way of erupting
quite unexpectedly as did the recent Dominican crisis. 6 These situations
are generally not subject to the use of even tactical nuclear weapons at
this time and what is even more disconcerting to a country with large
inventories of expensive weapons; war is often conducred with extremely
primitive weapons. Perhaps the prime example of this was the armed
overthrow in Cuba, by rebels without air support or weapons larger than
a few 50mm cannons, of a firmly entrenched force. * This is not to say
that expensive weapons or at least large amounts of material are not
required or at least helpful in subduing guerilla insurrection. As a rule
of thumb a ten to one superiority of forces is claimed necessary to
completely overcome a dedicated guerilla force in its home territory.
These operations can become both time consuming and costly and it would
appear that in a long drawn out war of attrition the advantages normally
accruing to the larger better equipped forces are somewhat reduced in
effectiveness.. Many such enemy actions have required extensive
countermeasures on our part. When combined with statements such as
Premier Khrushchev's United Nations "Wars of Liberation" speech of
1961 the evidence would indicate out opponents would hopefully have us
spend ourselves into defeat. While it is true that from the military and
political viewpoints these operations may h^ave to be considered as l^ss
than a complete success the same is not true from the economic viewpoint.
As long as the economy of the coutry is producing at less than maximum
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capacity due to either unemployment of labor or underutilization of capital
equipment munitions expenditures will act as a continued stimulus. This
is due to both the direct effects in the primary supplying industries and
also the secondary or multiplier effects through the various "backup"
levels as wages are spent, capital equipment purchased and raw materials
consumed.
Based on time span the limited action generally falls into one of two
categories. The first or short term type is perhaps best typified by the
Berlin Crisis of 1961 where no forces were actually engaged and the
"crisis" in effect evaporated as soon as we showed our determination
and apparent ability to react. A second example of this type was the
"Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962. Once again the reaction was swift
althought the means used to effect the reaction was a combination of
rapid deployment of Regular Forces and "Timely Television Appearances"
by the President and Secretary of Defense rather than a recall of Reserve
Forces. One of the primary reasons for this difference in treatment was
the increased number of "options" available in conventional forces at
this time with respect to early 1961 as previously noted. This point will
be elaborated upon in later paragraphs.
The second category naturally is the long term engagement. Although
it may be precipitated suddenly the over-all character is one of constant
buildup to some higher level after the initial contact period and a con-
tinued action of sufficient duration to permit orderly rotation of forces.
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Viet Nam, Kor^a and perhaps the Dominican Republic action will fit within
this category. It is worthy of note at this point that Reserve Forces were
utilized in only one oi these actions. Since that time however, the general
makeup of the Regular Forces has undergone and is undergoing drastic
revision as will be noted.
With respect to the employment of ground based aviation forces these
limited engagements often pose definite restrictions. In many cases land
based units have difficutly in deploying efficiently due to the physical
consideration of the base itself such as runway characteristics and
maintenance facilities. In all cases logistic support since it must usually
start from a very low level is quite expensive. Political considerations
are often involved since the occupation and modification of real estate by
United States Forces may not be advantageous to the friendly indigenous
factions for a variety of reasons. In any case the difficulty involved in
security operations and the always present probability of catastrophic
losses due to reverses to the land forces must be allowed for. When the
foregoing is considered and superimposed on the actual requirements for
these types of conflicts, Naval Forces afloat seem to be the logical
answer. Carrier airpower can be employed without involving third parties
or involving treaties, agreements or overflight rights. This is not to
say that catastrophic losses could not occur in this area also. However,
within the foreseeable future and considering the capabilities of the
probable protagonists it appears that the risk of losses involved is
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outweighed by the advantages of employment of some level of aviation
forces afloat. In certain areas these may be the only aviation forces
that may.be brought to bear for the reasons noted above. For these
situations the risk and cost however high will have to bthassumed,
The foregoing has attempted to give an overall picture of the present
Military-Economic situation with respect to the types of wars, strategic
situation and some of their cost implications for the pa rticular type of
forces with which we are concerned.
In brief, as a nation, we are concerned with meeting the requirements
imposed by a series of long and short term limited type engagements while
maintaining a sizeable deterrent and current capability in the area of
nuclear warfare. Capabilities in both these areas have increased sub-
stantially since 1961 when Secretary McNamara assumed office. As
noted continuing emphasis is being maintained on a build up, especially





See Hitch and McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear
Age (Caimbridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) and Dennis Gabor,
Inventing the Future . (1st American Edii, N.Y. Knopf, 1964)
2. In Korea, during 1951, a greater total bomb weight was dropped
than all of World War II. This is partially due to aircraft capabilities
were one pilot in an AD2 could carry more weight on a longer mis&ion
than a B-17 Flying Fortress.
3. C. O, Holmquist, "Modern Naval Aviation", United States Naval
Review , 1962-1963. February 1964.
4. Hitch and McKean, pj). cit. , p. 10.
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5. W. W. Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy , (New York: Harper and
Row, 1964), pp. 90-105.
6. Actually the administration was quite aware of the upcoming
crisis what was unexpected was the rapid apparent involvement of the
communists and the bloody character it assumed.
7. Other recent examples of these include the shields used by
United Nations troops in the Congo to protect themselves against
tribesmens stones, spears and arrows, Helicopters in Viet Nam
returning with arrows in them, the bamboo stakes of the Viet Cong




Where then should the Selected Naval Reserve Fit within the picture
painted in the previous paragraphs? This depends naturally on the
interaction of two closely interwoven factors; capabilities and requirements
In the following section the requirements of the present and foreseeable
future will be discussedo
The Fiscal, Year 1965 Joint Staff Combat Plan (JSCP) sets up the
following possible requirements for what would be considered combat
employment of reserve forces, This would be during a Cold War (including
Limited Warfare Conflicts) when they would:
1, Augment active forces in contingencies requiring rapid but
limited mobilization.
2 = Reinforce active forces for protracted combat.
3. Augment or replenish combat ready forces in continental United
States.
4. Provide an expanded base for long scale mobilization.
5 Assist in recovery and reconstruction measures,
However, at the present time there are no Naval Reserve Forces of
any type that are committed to specific contingency plans, *
If full mobilization occurred all of the selected air reserve squadrons
and their aircraft would be called to active duty during first phase along
with the various support squadrons. As previously noted the flying units

55
would form 40 regular sized squadrons and then supply additional
personnel to augment active squadrons and various fleet and shore
support activities. Personnel of the supporting units with the exception
of the NARMUs would report as individuals to pre-assigned mobilization
billets, Table VI shows planned first phase personnel requirements.
TABLE VI





NARMU 220 1, 097 VP 1,004 4,900
NARDIV 40 352 VS 187 581
NAIRU 713 191 HS 142 600
AWS 1, 054 3, 543 VA(J) 16 104




These requirements concern full mobilization but could be modified
for other situations when available active components were insufficient
to meet obligations or when activation of a large group of reserves was
desired to demonstrate a national solidarity or determination in a
particular circumstance. This second cause for recall was exemplified
by the 1961-1962 Berlin Crisis callup. However, a somewhat similar
although faster breaking and perhaps even more urgent situation existed
in Cuba in 1963 and no recall of Reserves was made at that time. 2
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Bartialiy for the reason previously noted a much larger conventional. native
duty force was available for deployment titan had been available i 1961.
"What ever the background it would appear that the secondares son in itself
woulu not pruvide a valid basis for continuance of a large reserve force
with the present regular capability unless of course the mere existence
of such a force could act as a deterrent. Looking further back in the
analysis it was stated that the possibility of a large scale general or
nuclear conflict compared to a series of individual or a number of
simultaneous "limited" war situations is quite small. This leaves only
the general requirement for a reserve force in being to supplement
inadequate regular forces when required for these various limited war
operations. v,
Moving from the general to Lhe specific it must be determined which
requirements apply to the Selected am aval Air Reserve. In order to provide
a more complete answer the program is best divided between trie aviation
squadrons (plus the i^ARiviUs) and the various support units, NAIRIJ, WEPTlJ
etc. since they perform different functions. Considering the aviation
squadrons first it would appear that they could possibly be employable
at some level in all oi die possible uses stated in the Fiscal ¥ear 1965
JSCP. Each oi these possibilities will be discussed separately.
The first JSGP requirement, "Augmentation of active forces in
contingencies requiring rapid but limited mobilization" could occur in




probabilities , The first and most likely would require overseas deploy-
ment in areas outside the operating range of Reserve Aircraft, from a
United States base. If seaborn forces were to be utilized the operating
squadrons would require a recent carrier qualification which tney do not
have, under optimum conditions approximately 30 days would be required
to attain this proficiency. As previously noted, if land operations were
entailed the size of the contingent that could operate would in most
cases be severly restricted size wise and in any case would normally
fall within the province of the Air Force or marine Aviation. These
circumstances which will in all probability remain unchanged in the
future would effectively eliminate this particular facet of the first
requirement with respect to the flying squadrons.
The second setting less likely but entirely feasible would be that
requiring rapid overseas deployment in an area within operating range
of United States facilities. The feasibility of response to this particular
type of requirement would only be limited by ability of the reserves to
maintain themselves in a deployed state. This in turn would depend
partially on the abilities of the tactical support VR squadrons and the
reserves compatibility with regular equipment.
The third setting would include operations from the continental
United States. This requirement is discussed more generally with respect
to the third general requirement of the JSCP in a following paragraph.
The second JSCEP requirement, "reinforcement of active forces for
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protracted combat" appears to be a valid requirement for the reserve
forces if the active forces are over extended in terms of available
equipment and manpower. This would be due to a large increase in the
number of active fronts or an increase in combat attrition beyond the
replacement capabilities of the active forces. Circumstances such as
these would not normally occur overnight for the primary reason that
there is a build in elasticity to the existing forces especially since
1962 that did not exist for instance, in 1950 in Korea, Active Naval
Aviation Forces at present are larger^ and of sufficient size to over-
come all but extremely severe atrrition losses. ^ In addition they
are better equipped and posses greater individual capability as a
squadron or an Air Group and in general maintain themselves at a higher
state of readiness although this is perhaps of nebulous value for discus-
sion. From the practical standpoint, adding a Reserve Air Group to the
active forces wouldentail de-moth balling and shaking down one or
two carriers which in itself is a formidable and time consuming task.
Secondary reasons favoring this slow build up view point would include
the increased use of multi-nation forces and the fact that the lines of
responsibility or interest have been drawn more closely in recent years,
which tends to reduce the chance of surprise major engagements. Opposed
to this of course is the apparently increasing number of actual and potential




The third use of Reserves, "augmenting combat ready forces in
continental United States" would seem to be merely an extension of the
previous case except that the requirement for immediate carrier qualifica-
tion or additional ships has been removed. This means the response time
could be quicker and tactical support considerably simpler since many
units could deploy at their own home station. The present emphasis on
AS"W duties (necessarily land based at present) utilizes half the reserve
aircraft and is ideally suited to this task. In addition the tactical support
VR squadrons would be working in completely familiar territory. In effect
this was the situation that existed during the Berlin Crisis in 1961-1962.
It must be reiterated at this point though that this is primarily a defensive
tool whose use presupposes attack or imminent danger to continental
United States Installations, a situation not likely to occur during limited
war.
When considering the Selected Reserve Aircraft Squadrons for the
fourth use, as. "an expanded base for long scale mobilization" ( careful
note should be made of the increasing disparity between fleet and reserve
equipment- It is true that there will undoubtably be valid missions for
the reserves as they are presently equipped for some time to come. This
is despite the fact that in many areas they will not be able to perform
because of superior capabilities of enemy forces with more modern aircraft
and armament, t However* their value as an expanded base will definitely
.decrease with time due, to increasing support costs unless the reserve
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equipment is continuously updated and made more compatible with regular
systems than they J^ave been in the past.
Finally it would appear that definite use could be made of the VR
and perhaps VP squadrons in recovery and reconstruction measures.
However, this would normally imply a cressation of hostilities and an
extended time period during which regular forces if at all available would
normally be emphasized depending of course on availability and previous
attrition losses. So while entirely feasible this particular use does not
seem too probable.
Although the support units and the flying units would probably be
recalled similtaneously in a major mobilization they would as previously
noted perform different functions. That is because all the individuals
involved in this area would be recalled on an individual basis and no
equipment, only individual skills, are involved. It would appear that
any of the uses cited by the Fiscal Year 1965 JSCP could be fulfilled
by various individuals in the supporting units. The level of recall would
depend naturally on the specific requirements imposed by am particular
situation and the number of individuals available for assignment.
In summary then the present and foreseeable realistic requirements
for the Selected Naval Air Reserve cover two separate spectra. The
first, a rather restricted role for the flying squadrons would consist
primarily of the requirement to reinforce active forces for protracted
combat when attrition losses become severe or committments increase
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considerably above the present level. Next,, but of considerably lesser
probability would be the requirement to augment in certain overseas
contingencies within range of United States facilities. The other require-
ments such as the replenishment or augmentation of combat ready forces
in the continental United States particulary in the AS"W area or the
provision of an expanded base for long scale mobilization seem consider-
ably less probable for the reasons previously noted.
The role for the support groups is considerably less restricted since
individuals, group or units could be recalled at any time to serve in
specific pre-assigned mobilization billets.
The preceeding has been concerned primarily with various types of
combat employments. There are many other requirements that do not fall
within this area presently being fulfilled by various reserve forces.
These would include the various secondary missions of CNARESTRA
previously mentioned such as recruiting and assisting in regular operations
plus other functions such as search and rescue, good will and naval
promotion and at times disaster assistance Close scrutiny of these
functions however, shows that the active duty component not the
Selected Air Reserve Units are responsible for all or a good part of these
tasks in the majority of these areas. This aspect of the situation then
will not have direct bearing on our analysis of the Selected Air Reserve,




1. United States Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
OP-05R, Study of Naval Reserve Components, (U), 2 July 1964.
2. Two Air Force Reserve Wings were activated at this time but did
not deploy and were released in a matter of a few days as the urgency
of the situation abated.
3. In fiscal 1965 there were approximately 34, 000 aviators on
active duty in the Navy.
4. BuPers has stated that there is a shortage of over 2, 000 junior





Having considered the probable requirements for the Selected Naval
Air Reserve the next area of attention should be its present and projected
capabilities to perform these tasks adequately. Capabilities in any
organization are probably best described as a function of personnel in
terms of avaialbility, training and experience plus available equipment
to do the job and finally morale.
With respect to personnel levels the reserves are presently having
problems in recruiting and retention in several areas. The first of these
concerns aviators where onboard count has remained at approximately 90
percent of allowance for several years. In recent years the Navy output
from the training command has been reduced from 2, 400 to 1, 100 aviators
annually. In addition the active duty obligation has been increased from
three to five years. The net result of these two factors is that very few
aviators are being released to inactive duty. To meet requirements an
increasing number of waivers extending the age limit for certain types
of flying duty are being granted. Since 1962 the number of waivers
granted exceeded the number of aviators released from active duty. One
result of this general situation is that the average age in grade for all
officers is increasing approximately six months per year. Unless this
overall trend is reversed in the aviator area the remaining personnel will
not be capable of efficiently manning their equipment.
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In the ground officer area this partiQular situation is not quite as
severe since the experience requirements are not subordinated to the
physical requirements as in the case of the aviators. However, the
command has been forced to grant a considerable number of waivers in
this area also as increasing numbers of senior officers pass through the
twenty year mark. For some time official policy would not allow waivers
in this particular area. However, in recent years, after considerable
pressure on Congress and DOD by the Reserve Officer Association and
other organizations permission has been granted to allow waivers where
there are vacancies in that particular officer's unit. By this means a
large and valuable pool of experience has been retained and is available
for possible recall. However, the problem of over age in grade and the
advanced senority of reserves with respect to regular counterparts that
would occur upon mobilization remains. This is an extremely undesirable
possibility in the thinking of many policy level officials. Unfortunately
the waiver system is only a partial stop gap since these individuals will
be forced out by law after completing 30 years satisfactory federal
service or at age 62 which ever occurs first. And finally despite the
increasing prevalence of waivers the onboard count for non aviator officers
has remained below eighty percen.tof- allowance since the late 1950's,
This is due in part to an expansion of the program since that time as
additional units have been created and also to the failure of sufficient
numbers of recently released officers to affiliate.
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At the enlisted level the problem of maintaining a manning level
based on both numbers and skills is more severe than in the officer area.
There are continuing shortages in critical rates such as electronics
repairmen, radar man and other high skill rates. In recent years onboard
count has remained below eighty percent of allowance overall. This
however, is not the entire picture. There is a serious imbalance between
petty officers and unrated men with an excess of unrated men. Attrition
rates in the lower ranks are very high after the young enlistee serves his
allotted time. He becomes draft exempt on the basis of one year in a
selected reserve squadron^ and two years of active duty and in most cases
does not reaffiliate when released. If he is reaffiliated upon release
from active duty existing laws call for a total service of eight years.
Attrition rates for these men after their eight year tour exceeds seventy
five percent.
This problem of low retention is certainly not -peculiar to the Reserve
forces. However, there are additional factors beyond those encountered
by the regulars which are of concern primarily to reserves and some
quite peculiar to the Naval Selected Air Reserve. While these items are
not necessarily germane to reserve capability in itself, they do affect
it and so will be noted here. Of first importance is that reserve duty
is extra duty above and beyond a civilian occupation with the real
possibility of a long enforced separation from the primary business of
developing a civilian career or business. In many cases it is a real
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sacrifice in a monetary sense especially for enlisted personnel who will
be making far in excess of their reserve pay at positions with considerably
more status than their role in the reserve., Even for personnel in lower
level civilian jobs a weekend duty in lieu of overtime at their normal
work will entail a net monetary loss. Superimposed on these factors is
the requirement of a two week annual cruise away from home. In many
cases leave without pay from the civilian job is involved or else vacation
periods must be used. This does not make for happy family relations to
say the least.
One major area of financial renumeration working towards increased
retention in the regulars is severely weakened in the reserves. This is
the matter of retirement. Not only is it low, * but it does not commence
until the individual reaches age 62, assuming a prior minimum of 20 years
of satisfactory federal service. This is a poor incentive for the young
enlisted or officer who has to complete an additional 12 to 14 years before
he becomes eligible to wait for retiremento
Finally the physical fact of affiliating has become more difficult since
the closing of ten bases in the late 1950's. Although the Reserve Air Lift
operated by the VR squadrons brings thousands of personnel to drill monthly
the area coverage and therefore the available personnel have been severe-
ly reduced. Many otherwise willing individuals have been forced to
disassociate due to the excessive commuting distances involved. So
by virtue of all these factors the ultimate capability of the reserve is




In the area of training the problems involved are a reflection of those
of the active duty contingent previously noted. The "learning situation"
is difficult to induce in the weekend enviornment when so much of the ^
time is involved with administrative detail, catching up and planning
operations/ for satisfactory training. All of this is especially difficult
for the non veteran enlisted man. The overall time span for learning
a particular skill is streched far beyond normal limits unless he can
attend special training periods when he may be free from school or between
civilian jobs„ j. Within the veteran area there is another large group of
enlisted personnel in a similarly difficult but different situation,, There
are approximately 500 individuals in non aviation rates varying from
butcher to boilermaker. These people are presently training in aviation
rates but it is a slow process. If mobilized their value would be far
below that normally accruing to the level at which they are rated.
The training problem is not as severe with officer personnel since
they have had sufficient active duty in the vast majority of cases to have
perfected their particular skills. For the pilots the major problems occur
when aircraft types are changed. Actually this has not happened too often
in recent years. The average pilot although older than his regular counter-
part is a competent professional in the equipment he is presently utilizing.
The flying equipment of the Air Reserve covers a considerable range
as previously noted. Transport equipment is old, not d#ery efficient on
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a cost per-ton-mile basis but it is adequate for the tactical support of
reserve forces which is its primary mission. At their present level of
experience and training the VR personnel are willing to operate in the
^liropeon Theater but they are not willing to operate West of Hawaii.
In the area of ASW operations the reserves are flying aircraft
phased out of regular fleet operations but which are nevertheless capable
of performing their assigned mission if properly manned and operated.
These aircraft and their attendant gear are admittedly not as efficient
as present fleet equipment but during an increased tempo of operations
would act as a substantial complement to fleet equipment.
The same general comment would be applied to the attack and fighter
area. With the recent addition of the F-8^Crusader the reserve air arm
has moved into the "1, 000 mph class". Unfortunately there are not
sufficient numbers of these aircraft for more than three bases. With the
exception of the F6A Skyray, and the FJMB Furies the other Reserve
fighter and attack aircraft are still being used in various models by fleet
forces and have obvious capabilities in laany areas of limited war. One
problem in this area that cannot be ignored however, is the fact that
the Marine Aviation Reserve lays equal claim to these same aircraft.
The Marine mission is becoming increasingly divergent to that of the
Navy and is presently devoted to direct support of ground forces. Depend-
ing on the type of requirements and their timing the Navy capability could




The reserve aircraft stable as a whole despite the recent introduction
of the new fighter aircraft and a few past World "War II transports is
falling further behind the fleet each year. The primary reason as
previously noted is the rising colst per unit and the lowering level of
available funds. The newer systems are increasingly complex, an"
unfortunate but real phenomenon, and there is more than reasqnable doubt
as to the reserves' ability to maintain these systems . The old problem
of active duty personnel pre-empting maintenance chores to hold avail=
ibility high is compounded as the required skill levels rise and new
systems are introduced. The net result is a difficult dilemma. On the
one side, valid missions may remain for the old equipment but it will
not last forever and on the other side it may not be possible to preform
the mission satisfactorily with new equipment due to maintenance problems,
Added to this dilemma is the increasing difficulty in obtaining aircraft
to perform both Marine and Navy missions adequately.
The support squadron manning problems are at least as severe as
those of the flying units, due mainly perhaps to lack of glamour and
flight pay, Personnel onboard counts in recent years have averaged
approximately 70 percent of allowance. However, the training, experience
level and equipment problems in the support squadrons are considerably
less severe expecially in the NAIRUs, Air Wing Staffs and WEPTUs.
These facets have been commented on in previous paragraphs. Within
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these squadrons much of the advanced training is provided by squadron
officer personnel, rather than by active duty instructors as in the aircraft
squadrons,, Annaal training duty is performed with or. at regular squadrons
or installations so that must personnel remain,,: current with recent
developmerits. As operating entities the WEPTUs and NAIRUs are presently
producing finished studies for various Navy Department components in «
Engineering, ivianage.nent, Production, Procurement, iviaintenance /
Intelligence and other allied fields , These particular capabilities would
cease to be available during a mobilization period since the units disband
and. . 'individual^ =. are recalled, to their particular mobilization billets,
When considering the morale oi the Selected Naval Air Reserve two
words are important. The first is selected and the .second volunteer.
All of the personnel involved are volunteers. Although attrition is high
in the lower enlisted grades it is very low among upper grade enlisted
and officer personnel. These people have been "selected" in the true
sense of the word and in general are proud of their position in the defense
structure, by reason of long acquaintance alone they have built up a
high level of skill and confidence in their equipment, It must be remembered
they are training year after year after year to perform relatively the same
mission. There are a considerable number of trophies awarded for excel-
lence in many different areas each year. Competition between the various
units for these awards is always keen and is one sure indicator of morale.
One common phrase heard is "we're old and slow but we're ready to go".
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There are many reasons for continued affiliation for the individual reserve.
These range from a modified form of draft dodging, through the desire for
retirement benefits and to retain Navy association and the desire to fly or
be around aircraft to pure patriotism. For the average individual his
reasons are probably a thorough mix of several of these. The net result
though is a high level of morale command wise which in itself does much
to improve the cabability of the Reserve to fulfill its assigned mission
The prior paragraphs have covered in brief the majority of the facets
of the situation that bear on capability. Admittedly no single aspect has
been treated in depth but rather an attempt has been made to at least
touch on all of what are considered the pertinent points. The emphasis
has been on the problems that reduce the capability since the requirements
or idealized missions were discussed in the previous chapter.
In summary then what are the apparent capabilities of the Selected
Naval Air Reserve with respect to the probable requirements of Chapter V.?
At the present time and in the near future based on present manning levels
and a 95 percent effective personnel recall rate^ the Reserves could
supply at the most thirty fleet sized flying squadrons for full mobilization.
Officer complement would average at least a grade higher than in fleet
squadrons and would be several years older in grade than regular counter-
parts. Enlisted complement would be seriously lacking at the 3rd and
2nd class Petty Officer levels and in all highly technical rates. Approxi-
mately twenty percent active duty rated personnel^ reserve or regular
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would be required to insure adequate aircraft availability. These squadrons
would be capable of operating within the continental limits of the United
States from their home bases within 24 hours and at advanced bases within
48 to 7 2 hours. For the carrier aircraft type squadrons they would be able
to qualify satisfactorily within 30 days of recall. Operations would be
dependent in a large part however on the support capabilities of the VR
squadrons and incompatibilites between reserve and regular equipment
would severely limit capabilities in advanced areas or over an extended
period during full mobilization.
All of the above presupposes that the Marine Air Reserve contingent
have not previously pre-empted the fighter, attack and helicopter aircraft.
Depending on the type and orcjer of the mobilization requirements there is
a definite possibility of this occurrence. Especially during a full mobi-
lization some percentage of these aircraft would be allotted to the Marines.
However since, this is a non-estimable quantity at present and will not
effect the various alternatives open to the Naval Selected Air Reserve it
will not be discussed furthpr. When and if such a situation did occur
the personnel affected would still be available to augment active squadrons.
The equipment capabilities of the reserve squadrons would have to
be rated considerably below that of operating fleet squadrons with respect
to range, speed, carrying power and mission effectiveness. Although
exact figures are not available a rough estimate would place them at an




Within the support squadrons there would be available at present
approximately, 2, 500 officers and 5, 500 enlisted men for full mobilization.
These figures are also based on existing manning levels and an effective
personnel recall rate of 95 percent. NARDIV personnel would deploy to
various carriers and tenders . WEPTU personnel would go to BuWeps and
BuWeps Field Activities. The NAIRUs, and Air Wing Staffs would go to
ships, squadrons, staffs, stations and OPNAV while the JMARiVIUs wquld
deploy with the reserve flying squadrons or to various fleet support
centers. Due to their lack of equipment requirements the future capabilities
of the support squadrons will not be diminished as severely as those of the
flying squadrons. However, there is and will continue to be a general
diminution of future capabilities of both flying and support squadrons with
respect to personnel factors. Fewer number of veterans
,
both officer and
enlisted, are affiliating in the organized reserve. The number of reserves
on active duty is a small fraction of those during World War II or the
Korean period and the average individual leaving active duty prior to
retirement at the present time is doing so because he "wants out" not
because he is being involuntarily released. Organized reserve duty offers




1. For the average Reserve officer with five years active duty, his
retirement pay would be approximately 40 percent to 45 percent of his
regular counterpart based on 20 years service. For the enlisted man
with two years active duty it would be 25 percent to 30 percent.
2. United States Navy, Office of the Cuief of Naval Operations,




Basically there are four possible alternatives to the problem of
optimum levels of reserve participation that could be considered in the
light of the information developed thus far:
1. Assume that no part of the mission needs to be performed by
reserve forces and eliminate the capability.
2 = Assume that all or part of the mission should be performed by
reserve forces and:
(a) continue to maintain the existing forces at their present level.
(b) decrease the size of the existing forces and simultaneously
increase the size or capability of the active forces.
(c) increase the size and capability of the reserve forces.
In effect the major portion of the discussion thus far has concerned
the second alternative, maintaining the existing forces at their present
level with respect to cost, compostion and capability., The remaining
three courses of action, either eliminating, increasing or decreasing the
reserve force are our actual alternatives to this status quo. Are any of
them feasible and what are the relative costs? In keeping with the
previous portions of the discussion the flying squadrons and support
squadrons will be considered separately.
With respect to the flying squadrons if we are to be relistic it miast
be admitted that the trend in recent years has been towards the last
alternative^ that is a decreased reserve capability with respect to numbers
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of aircraft and personnel. This has been accompanied by an overall
increased size and mobility in active contingents particularly since late
1961 of all the armed forces and increased emphasis on limited war combat
capability. This build up has been especially emphasized in the Army
Special Forces and Aviation Support Groups, greatly increased airlift
capability in the Army and Air Force and by new airborne troop deployment
techniques in %he Marines. No significant change in Navy techniques
have envolved during this same period, however. The carrier based force
has been considered more than adequate in the limited war situatiorj(s.
Wjith the increased overall mobility and wider capabilities in the other
armed forces the services of the carrier based force have declined in
relative if not real value.
New equipment concepts that are expected to be available as hardware
in the near future will alter the requirements, capability and make up of
all these forces and in so doing will definitely affect the requirement
for reserve forces. Two of these developments affecting the carrier force
include the Marines SATS concept and the V-STOL aircraft developments.
The Marine SATS (Short Airfield for Tactical Support) concept is
partially operational at present and utilizes a package airfield with built
in catapult and arresting gear. It can be placed on practically any level
3, 000 foot road or similar surface and operate with high performance
carrier aircraft,, This concept has been developed to reduce dependence
on both prepared airfield sites and carriers. The resulting increase in
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Marine mobility has the direct effect of requiring less naval air support
which in turn reduces Naval Air Reserve requirements all other things
remaining equal.
The second development mentioned, the Vertical or Short Takeoff or
Landing Aircraft, is somewhat less advanced from an operational viewpoint.
It has however, drawn considerably more attention than the Marine SATS
package because of its wider application and further reaching ramifications,
It is not inconceivable that these aircraft with their unique ability to
operate from extremely small areas will completely revise the concept of
the large super carrier task force. Mobility would increase by an order
of magnitude. No operating area, land or sea, would be too remote or
small and forces could be subdivided to any number without excessive
increases in support costs. Once again based on holding present forces
constant the reserve backup force requirement would be decreased.
Other developments somewhat further in the future promise even more
interesting speculation as to the changing nature of naval aviation.
Prominently included among these would be the amphibious ground effects
machines which would perhaps be operated in conjunction with the V-STOL
aircraft and also the high speed hydro ship and aqua plane ship which will
operate in the 100 knot class and would be a highly effective ASW weapon.
This discussion of the near and not quite so near future has not been
an idle departure from our original question as to feasible alternatives.
The fact of the matter is, that this equipment is being developed and
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procured to replace and supplement existing equipment. Our discussion
in this area then should not be centered so much on whether or not these
particular changes are feasible or economic but rather what will be their
effect on the Naval Sfe'lected Air Reserve. Without question the primary
effect as stated is to reduce the overall requii . it for the flying
squadrons. And unless some of this advanced equipment filters down
to the reserve level, which does not appear likely in the light of present
policies, the disparity between reserve and regular capabilities and
compatibility will increase beyond present limits with the net effect of
further restricting the reserve mission.
In effect then the portion of this first alternative that remains open
to comment or recommendation is to determine hy what amount this com-
ponent of the reserve force shall be decreased. This naturally would
depend on an evaluation of the increased capabilities of the regular forces
with respect to, calculated present and future requirements.
The second alternative, to increase the size and capability of the
Reserves does not appear td be economically feasible from the standpoint
of either personnel or equipment. As previously discussed the reserves
are below authorized personnel levels at present and the problem will
become worse in the future with respect to both numbers and individual
capabilities. With this background increased amounts of equipment alone
will not improve capability. However, different equipment if not excessive-
ly complicated could improve existing capability. Unfortunately the trend
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in existing fleet equipment, which is the only equipment available to the
reserves, is continuously tending to increased complexity. Unless this
trend is definitely reversed only minor increases in reserve capability
with respect to existing requirements seem feasible and then only for the
near future.
The remaining possible alternative, eliminating the reserve capability
is undoubtedly the most clear cut albeit drastic of the possible decisions
.
At the present time considering the unsettled military-economic situations
and the existing capability of the active duty forces the cost of their
providing similar capability on a full time basis does not appear econom-
ically justified. Going back to our earlier figures of 30 fleet sized
squadrons at 65 percent effectiveness the additional aircraft procurement
alone for equivalent effectiveness would be in excess of $500, 000, 000. *•
Total direct operating costs, upkeep and personnel could reasonably be
expected to at least double this figure in a five year period. Indirect
support costs would at least equal direct support costs. This would
yield a figure in excess of $300, 000, 000 per year over the expected five
year life of the weapon systems based on Fiscal year 1965 costs.
This figure does not compare too favorably with the $95, 000, 000
annual cost of the equivalent reserve system. One basic assumption
inherent in this alternative is that it would be possible to recruit and
retain the approximately 15 percent additional active duty aviation person-
nel to maintain this increased capability. The fact of the matter is that
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many of the same personnel problems faced by the reserves are found
within the regular structure. Definite shortages exist at this time
throughout Naval Aviation and„recently the Navy was forced to lower
mental requirements for enlistees in an attempt to maintain quotas.
Therefore there is no guarantee of success but more probably a serious
question whether this increased level could be maintained without a
general mobilization or at least including the Navy in the draft.
The alternatives facing the support squadrons with respect to their
future employment are similar to those of the flying squadrons but the
relative feasibilities appear to vary considerably. The basic symptom
if not cause behind this view is that the absolute strength levels, both
allowance and onboard count has increased slightly in this area in recent
11 v
years while the flying squadrons have been decreasing. Air Wing Staffs
have increased in size and in mission scope since their assignment to
augument the Atlantic and Pacific ASW Operational Control Centers in
1962.
Similarly the NAIRUs and WEPTUs have increased slightly in size and
their programs have been modified so that one of their primary duties as
an organization is to provide finished studies to the regular forces. In
this way they are acting as part time consultants. Establishment of the
NARDIVs in the early 1960,1.6 in areas where no Air Station is accessable
has tapped a definite source of personnel that can be trained in the basic
aviation rates. Their use of existing surface facilities has held costs

to a minimum.
Reduction of these capabilities within the reserve forces does not
appear feasible at this time as long as additional requirements continue
to be imposed. Complete elimination and subsequent assumption of the
mission by the active forces elicits the same logic that was applied to
the flying squadrons. If feasible missions exist but there is no definite
requirement in the light of the existing military situation that the capa-
bility be maintained by full time forces the cost is less if performed by
reserve forces.
As a separate alternative a substantial increase in the size and
capability in this area is perhaps more feasible than would first appear.
The main problem to any such expansion as previously noted would be
personnel rather than equipment. Therefore the solution would require
broadening the geographical base to regions not presently included.
Administrative costs would increase but not excessively if a Technical
Bureau representative for management control plus a Surface Training
Group for general military control was available in the general area.
NOTES
1. Based on 14 aircraft per squadron, and average aircraft costs in




Many of the recommendations that would have been made have been
mentioned throughout the text up to this point. The purpose of these
concluding paragraphs then will be primarily to collate, formalize and
to mention any additional factors not previously considered that may be
pertinent to the final analysis.
One of these factors that applies to the overall problem is the
present condition of the United States balance of payments. Excessive
purchases abroad, many in the area of defense have created a difficult
economic situation. By increasing the mobility of the active forces in
continental areas and then by commencing a partial withdrawal of overseas
forces the problem will be partially alleviated The net effect of. this
type of action would be to reduce dependence on reserve forces. Another
point not previously considered with respect to reserve recall or deploy-
ment is that it could be considered a sign of weakness in that active
forces were less than adequate and we were approaching the limit of our
capability.
A third extraneous factor, one that tends to the opposite direction
of the two noted above is the natural pre-dis position in the United States,
previously mentioned, to utilize Reserves in lieu of Regulars. Despite
the fact that the Regular buildup is far beyond any previous peacetime
period severe obvious cutbacks in Reserve capability have elicited strong
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influential opposition from many quarters in the past and will probably
continue to do so in the future.
As far as the total picture is concerned some determination must
be made at a policy level as to the severity of the threat, the level of
resource we are willing to devote to insuring against it and the types
of forces that will be required. What actually can be done in the field
of passive deterrence and active defense depends primarily on what will
be spent. And what will be spent depends in a large part on the type and
level of effectiveness of the additional increments that can be purchased
once the basic requirements are fulfilled.
Considering all of the foregoing, personnel, equipment, facilities,
capabilities and other pertinent factors it would appear logical to re-
commend an immediate sizeable reduction approximating 25 percent, in
the number of Selected Reserve Flying squadrons and active duty TAR
personnel. This should be primarily in the form of closing down of
specific facilities but a reduction in level at certain facilities would
probably be practical. The primary criteria would be the availability of
adequate numbers of capable personnel. Bases in areas of low population
density unless, required for strategic motives would be the most likely
candidates for elimination. If the build up of regular forces in size and
capability continues at the expected rate for the next five years as
planned it would appear reasonable that eventually the size of this portion




The remaining squadrons should be given the most modern equipment
they are capable of operating and maintaining with the aim of reducing
the wide existing cap between the effectiveness of a reserve and regular
squadron. The one exception to this would be with the fighter and attack
aircraft which should be gradually phased out of the reserve program.
The newer weapons in this area are too difficult to fly and maintain and
the part time pilot and mechanic-technician cannot become truly effective
in their use.
Less emphasis should be placed on unit training in this area. Pilots
and ground crew members should take their annual training as individuals
or small groups with or without their equipment but at a regular installa-
tion integrated with the operating forces. Mobilization plans should be
based on these individuals augmenting to particular active duty squadrons
or stations rather than deploying as a unit which does not appear feasible
or probable for the reasons previously noted.
Finally the size and number of the supporting type units should be
increased, preferably on a wider geographic basis. Whenever possible
existing Surface Reserve or Regular Navy installations should be utilized.
By this means the maximum number of interested experienced individuals
could be affiliated.
In conclusion, and briefly, it should be noted that all of the fore-
going has been based on what this author perceives as a logical develop-

85
ment of the present situation. In the light of future developments it is
conceivable that a different set of conclusions could be drawn from the
same material.. However, based on the available facts, considering the
past and expecting the future as considered herein the above recommenda-
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